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THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON 





This paper analyses political forces that cause an initial expansion of public spending on 
higher education and an ensuing decline in subsidies. Growing public expenditures increase 
the future size of the higher income class and thus boost future demand for education. This 
demand shift implies that the initial subsidy per student becomes too expensive to be 
politically sustainable. Despite a voters’ backlash that curbs education subsidies, overall 
enrolments continue to rise. But the participation rate of the children of lower income 
families, that went up in the expansion period, declines over time, both in absolute terms and 
relative to the rate of their counterparts from higher income households. 
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Many European countries traditionally have generous public systems of higher ed-
ucation. Tuition at universities is usually free, and a combination of grants and
(interest free) loans provides a fairly attractive economic environment for students
even from lower income families. But the mood seems to be changing in many of
these ‘traditional’ European countries, and the call for students to contribute more
to the costs of their education has become louder. In England, universities can now
charge up to £ 3,000 in tuition fees instead of the former ﬂat rate of £ 1,115. De-
spite substantial opposition and the emphasis of the current British government on
education, Tony Blair pushed through this new legislation, which he considered to
be “a very major ﬂagship reform” from which “there will be absolutely no retreat”
(see Economist, 2003). On the other side of the channel, so called long term stu-
dents are already being asked for money in some parts of Germany, and there is
a growing debate about the introduction of general tuition fees. The government
of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state, intends to introduce
general tuition fees by 2007. Even social democratic governments, which have tradi-
tionally carried the banner of free education, are rethinking their general approach
to education policy. All in all, public opinion has shifted in favour of requiring the
recipients of higher education to pay more.
There are various possible explanations for this emerging shift in attitude. One
fashionable line of reasoning links the recent development to globalisation. It stresses
that governments might be forced to partly withdraw from the education system
because intensiﬁed international tax competition restricts their ability to raise the
necessary revenues. Moreover, increasing mobility of skilled workers means that the
social returns to education do often not accrue in the country that has ﬁnanced the
accumulation of human capital, thus reducing the incentives to subsidize education.1
In contrast to this argumentation, I provide an explanation for the evolving shift
in education ﬁnance that does not refer to economic integration and its implications.
Instead, the attention is directed to the changes in political preferences and political
power over time that were caused by the initial expansion of public education itself.
The basic argument runs as follows: Skilled parents are the main driving force
behind subsidizing higher education, since most of the college and university students
are their children. But, at least at an early stage, their numbers are too small to
be pivotal. Only when the size of the educated class exceeds a threshold value,
does a ‘coalition’ in favour of government intervention, consisting of a majority of
1There are a number of papers which explore the relationship between labour market integration
and public spending on education from diﬀerent angles. See, for instance, Andersson and Konrad
(2003), Haupt and Janeba (2004), Poutvaara (2001), or Wildasin (2000).
1the skilled citizens and of lower income households with very gifted children, push
through extensive public education spending. Higher subsidies foster the number of
students and increase the number of the skilled people in the future. This educational
‘take-oﬀ’, however, later provokes a backlash. Since a bigger educated class boosts
the demand for higher education, public commitments become more expensive. Even
the supporters of government intervention then favour smaller subsidies and call for
larger private contributions. After an expansion phase, public spending on higher
education declines. Despite the cut in subsidies, the number of students increases
further, but this continuing rise in enrolment is the result of changes in class size
and the ensuing shift in demand for higher education.
The social implications are ambiguous. Resources are redistributed from those
families whose children receive only a basic education to those whose children attend
universities. This redistribution is mainly in favour of households with skilled par-
ents. But, although only a minority of the children from unskilled parents beneﬁts
from the subsidies, these transfers foster equality of opportunity and intergener-
ational income mobility. Conversely, the decline in public spending reduces the
participation rate of children from lower income families in higher education, both
in absolute terms and relative to that of children from higher income households. It
thus sets the social structure in concrete.
This line of reasoning is analysed in a model with two overlapping generations
in which young people with diﬀerent ability attend universities or receive only basic
schooling. The education choice takes place in each period’s second stage, after the
electorate has voted on public education spending. The present student body forms
the higher income class in the next period. Thus, two succeeding periods are linked,
since today’s choices shape tomorrow’s social stratiﬁcation, which in turn aﬀects
future decisions.
The explicit dynamic modelling distinguishes the current paper from the strand
of literature that deals with democratic choices for ﬁnancing higher education in
a static framework. Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) show that redistribution from
lower income to better oﬀ families occurs in a political equilibrium. The majority
favours only partial subsidisation of education as a device to exclude poorer citi-
zens from attending colleges and taking advantage of the transfers.2 In contrast to
Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), households diﬀer in income and ability of their chil-
dren in the present paper. As in De Fraja (2001), the battle lines are, thus, within
income groups and not only between diﬀerent classes. De Fraja (2001) contrasts an
admission test and a subsidy in a framework in which future earnings are uncertain
2Some more ‘optimistic’ explanations for government intervention in the political equilibrium
are mentioned in section 5.
2and people are risk averse. The two measures increase equality of opportunity, but
aﬀect equity ambiguously. A subsidy, for instance, makes, in particular, lower in-
come households whose children do not attend universities worse oﬀ. This issue is
taken up in the present paper too. But unlike both Fernandez and Rogerson (1995)
and De Fraja (2001), the current analysis explicitly focuses on how education policy
evolves over time, reﬂecting shifts in political preferences and power.
A dynamic political-economic analysis of education and income distribution has
been the subject of research in the second strand of literature closely related to
the present paper. Cardak (2004), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), and Gradstein
and Justman (1997) compare public and private education in an endogenous growth
framework. The applied approaches enable them to gain substantial insights into the
relationship between growth, income inequality, and education, but their frameworks
are not suitable for exploring the issues of the present paper. In their contributions,
the speciﬁcation of the utility function and the learning technology, combined with a
proportional tax on income, implies that all individuals at all times prefer the same
tax rate in the public education regime. So any conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s t si se x c l u d e d
from the outset. By contrast, in the current paper, citizens diﬀer profoundly in
their favoured policies in each period, and political preferences change over time.
Voters also disagree on the optimal policy in Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), where
the interplay between democracy, income distribution, and growth is examined.
Nevertheless, the political conﬂicts are again very diﬀerent from those in the present
paper, since in their model all individuals receive publicly funded education in the
same way.3
To sum up, unlike the static models mentioned above, the current paper explores
the evolution of higher education policy. In contrast to the dynamic approaches re-
ferred to above, it does this in a framework where citizens diﬀer in their preferred
policies and where only a subset of the population beneﬁts from education pol-
icy. In this respect, the present contribution extends the two branches of literature
mentioned and ﬁlls a gap between them.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, the
basic elements of the model are described. Section 3 explores the education choices
and the opposing political preferences. The evolution of the education policy, the
number of students and the participation rates is analysed in section 4. Afterwards,
3There are a number of further papers which analyse intergenerational earning mobility but
consider education policy as exogenously given (for instance, Bénabou, 2002, Glomm and Raviku-
mar, 2003, Iyigun, 1999, and Loury, 1981). These contributions can be regarded as complementary
to the political economic approaches. Others, like Perotti (1993), examine long run income dis-
tribution and human capital investments in the case of endogenously determined redistributive
policies (but ignore education policy).
3some generalisations and extension are discussed. This enables us to assess the
political implication of the present analysis in a broader context. The paper ends
with some concluding remarks.
2T h e M o d e l
This section presents a simple dynamic model for studying the evolution of public
education spending and social stratiﬁcation in a democracy. To this end, let us
consider a society with two overlapping generations. In each period, the citizens
ﬁrst democratically choose a tax that ﬁnances an education subsidy. Depending on
the policy implemented, the decisions on the education of the children are made
afterwards. Political preferences and education choices vary between households,
since families diﬀer in two dimensions. The ‘old’ generation is divided into two
income groups, and the young people diﬀer in their innate ability to acquire human
capital.
More precisely, the economy consists of a continuum of families, each comprising
one parent and one child, with total mass equal to one. Every member of the old
generation inelastically supplies one unit of labour, whereas the young people attend
institutions of higher education, for brevity referred to as universities, or receive only
some basic education. For analytical convenience, the following analysis abstracts
from the fact that the durations of the two levels of education are diﬀerent. Instead,
the diﬀerences are summed up by the single parameter ‘costs of education’, which
vary between the two education levels and, as described below, between individuals.
Households are heterogeneous in two respects. First, they can be divided into
two groups according to the income of the adults. Depending on whether the old
people attended university or not in the preceding period, they have either a skilled
or unskilled occupation and receive a gross wage wH or wL,w h e r ewH >w L holds.
The former group is referred to as the higher income class, and its counterpart is
referred to as the lower income class.
Second, children diﬀer in their innate ability to acquire human capital. This
feature is again captured by the costs of education.4 The lower the talent, the
higher are the costs of receiving a university degree. For simplicity, assume that
costs of basic schooling equal zero for all individuals while higher education costs
are uniformly distributed on the support [z,z]. The density function is identical for
4Alternatively, diﬀerent ability levels can, for instance, be modelled by diﬀerent probabilities of
receiving a university degree or by diﬀerent study durations (and thus distinct individual oppor-
tunity costs). These approaches lead to the same qualitative results, but they make the model less
tractable without providing additional insights.
4all young people of the two classes. It is invariant over time and common knowledge.
The parent-child household is regarded as the basic socioeconomic unit ‘ruled’
by the parent. The parent determines the spending on (family) consumption and
education reﬂecting her valuation of these two components.5 Her preferences are
represented by the utility function
Uij = U(xij,θ ij), j = H,L,( 1 )
where xij denotes consumption of the ith household of income group j in the current
period. The variable θij captures the utility the household attaches to the child’s
education. If the child goes to university, θij equals θ; otherwise θij = θ <θholds.
Hence, a parent is altruistic in the sense that she values her descendant’s quality
of education, which in turn determines the earning capacity she bequeaths to her
oﬀspring.6
The twice-continuously diﬀerentiable utility function is assumed to fulﬁlt h r e e
properties: (i) utility is strictly increasing in both consumption and education qual-
ity, (ii) U(xij,θ) >U (0,θ) holds for all xij > 0,a n d( i i i )i fU(x0,θ)=U(x00,θ),
then U(λx0,θ)=U(λx00,θ) for any λ>0.T h e ﬁrst property is obvious. Prop-
erty (ii) excludes implausible boundary solutions without any consumption. As
explored below, the third property means that the willingness to pay for higher
education is proportional to net income. This property is fulﬁlled, for instance, by
the Cobb-Douglas function U(xij,θ ij)=xα
ijθ
β
ij, α,β > 0, or the quasilinear function
U(xij,θ ij)=l n xij + θij. Since property (iii) is loosely related to the concept of
homotheticity, it is referred to as ‘quasi’-homotheticity.
A household whose child attends a university receives a uniform subsidy s, s ≥
5The simpliﬁcation that the parent decides on behalf of her child is widespread in the literature
(see, for instance, De Fraja, 2001, and Beviá and Iturbe-Ormaetxe, 2002). This assumption reﬂects
the strong personal and ﬁnancial ties between parents and their oﬀspring. Parents make, for
instance, predetermining schooling decisions at a stage at which the children are more or less
passive players without any precise ideas about the implications of these choices for their future.
Moreover, young adults face severe credit constraints largely due to information problems and the
inability to collateralise human capital. Thus, they can only ﬁnance their education if they are
supported by their parents or the public. Putting these arguments together, the ‘parentocracy’
serves as a reasonable proxy of educational decisions. Interestingly, many education subsidies are
indeed directly targeted at the parents and not at the students themselves. In many countries,
parents are eligible to tax deduction or child related transfers as long as their children attend
universities.
6Conditioning a parent’s choice on the child’s education quality or similar ‘myopic’ variables
instead of the child’s utility is common in dynamic political-economic analyses. Otherwise, the
models are intractable. Cf. Gradstein and Justman (1997) who use the earning capacity of the
children as an argument in the parents’ utility function. In Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), for
instance, parents beneﬁt from the quality of schools.
50. This subsidy is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax t on the working generation. A
household’s budget constraint is thus given by
xij = wj − t (in the case of basic education)
and xij = wj − t + s − zij (in the case of higher education), (2)
where zij denotes the child’s higher education costs.
The tax is non-negative and, to avoid the unrealistic case of de facto expropri-
ation, is assumed to be limited to t<w L. Additionally, the education policy is
constrained by the requirement of a balanced government budget in each period:
B = t − sE =0 ,( 3 )
where E denotes the ‘number’ or, more precisely, the mass of university students.7
Tax revenues t (recall that the size of each generation is normalized to one) have to
cover public education spending sE.
Given the households’ and government’s budget constraints, the utility-maximis-
ing parents make two decisions. In the ﬁrst stage, they democratically adopt a tax
t that ﬁnances the uniform education subsidy s. A proposal t is collectively chosen
if it wins every pairwise comparison against all other candidates. The assumption
that only the parents constitute the electorate captures the fact that when students
enter university they have barely voted once. The education system can thus be
considered as exogenous for the young adults, and depends on the choice of the
parents.
In the second stage, the parents decide whether they will provide the ﬁnancial
means for a higher education of their children, taking full account of the tax and its
implications on the subsidy level. The households’ consumption then results simply
as the diﬀerence between net income on the one hand and education expenditures
net of subsidy on the other hand.
Note that the current approach is compatible with diﬀerent institutional settings
in the education sector. In the case of private universities, the households are often
the immediate recipients of the transfers, using the subsidies to pay the tuition fees
and to cover the living costs of the students. If universities are publicly run, a
large part of the subsidy might go directly to these institutions and only a small
share is transferred to the households. For a family, however, it makes no diﬀerence
whether subsidies are directly paid to universities or whether the households receive
assistance to cover the university cheque.
7The term ‘number’ is often used, although it is not the very exact technical expression in the
case of a continuum of households.
6As will soon become evident, applying lump-sum taxes enables me to focus on
the conﬂict of interests between families whose children attend university on the one
side and those whose children do not on the other side. The changing constellation
in this conﬂict over time is already suﬃcient to explain a take-oﬀ in public spending
and the ensuing decline in education expenses.
3 Education Choice and Political Preferences
The ultimate goal is to explain the political evolution of public education spending
in a democracy and the social stratiﬁcation implied. Before we turn to the dy-
namics of the system, the ‘static’ equilibrium in a single period has to be analysed.
To this end, the households’ education choices for a given policy (s,t) and the re-
lationship between the tax t and the subsidy s are explored ﬁrst. Based on the
insights gained from this exercise, the political preferences and the emergence of
two opposing stances can be outlined.
3.1 Enrolments and Government Budget
When a household decides on the child’s education level, the family’s trade-oﬀ is
straightforward. A young individual goes to university if the household’s utility gain
resulting from a highly educated oﬀspring outweighs the utility loss induced by the
private education spending. The inequality U (wj − t + s − zji,θ) ≥ U (wj − t,θ),
which follows from inserting the budget constraint (2) into the utility function (1),
provides the necessary and suﬃcient condition for this to be the case. This condition
can be characterised more precisely. In Appendix A, lemma 1 shows that each parent
is ready to give up a constant fraction m ∈ (0,1) of the potential family consumption
to ﬁnance the education of her child. This conclusion directly follows from the
‘quasi’-homotheticity of the utility function (see property (iii) of this function). It,
in turn, means that a child attends university if, and only if,
zji ≤ m(wj − t)+s =: b zj (s,t) (4)
holds. The interpretation of (4) is easy. For a given policy (s,t), each parent is
willing to give up the share m of the potential consumption level wj − t.I f t h i s
willingness to pay for higher education and the subsidy s are together suﬃcient to
cover the costs zij,t h eo ﬀspring is sent to university.
Condition (4) has two obvious implications. First, facing a trade oﬀ between the
education level and consumption, parents are more inclined to invest in the human
capital of ‘low cost’ (i.e. highly intelligent) children than in that of costly (i.e. less
7able) ones. Second, since the willingness to pay for education increases in income,
the higher income family of the marginal student b zH spends more on education than
its poorer counterpart. Consequently, children with the same abilities, i.e. same
costs z, might acquire diﬀerent levels of human capital, although all parents place
the same value on higher education. In this sense, there is no equality of opportunity.
The fraction of children from lower-income families attending universities falls below
that of wealthier children receiving higher education, i.e.
γL (s,t)=
b zL − z
z − z
<
b zH − z
z − z
= γH (s,t),( 5 )
where γL and γH denote the respective fractions, referred to as participation rates,
and b zj is deﬁned by (4). Inequality (5) is backed by broad empirical evidence. In
Germany, for instance, the participation rates in 1996 ranged from 0.26 for the 18
to 21 years old from the lowest parental income quartile to 0.45 for those from
the highest one, despite rather low income inequality and higher education with no
tuition fees (BMBF, 1998).8
Using (5), the number of university students is given by
E (s,t)=γL(s,t)L + γH (s,t)H = γL(s,t)+[ γH (s,t) − γL (s,t)]H,( 6 )
where L and H denote the number of lower-income and higher-income families,
respectively. (Recall that the size of the population is normalized to unity, and thus
L =1− H holds.) Since the participation rate γH (s,t) is greater than γL(s,t),
enrolment E increases in the size H for a given policy (s,t), a relationship which
will be important in the following analysis.
For a given tax, the number of students determines the subsidy level, as the
government budget constraint (3) shows. This subsidy level, in turn, aﬀects the
number of students, as enrolment (6) shows. Taking these interactions between
these two ﬁgures into account, a unique subsidy s results for each tax t such that
(i) the government budget is balanced and (ii) each household’s education choice
is consistent with utility maximisation for the respective bundle (s,t).( N o t e t h a t
since a single parent has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the number of students, she
regards the subsidy as independent of her education choice.)
The resulting functional relationship between the tax t, which is determined in
the ﬁrst stage, and the subsidy s has two straightforward features. These properties
8Similarly, in Britain the participation ratio of the highest socioeconomic group was 0.79 in 1995
while that of the lowest group was a mere 0.12 (see Robertson and Hillman, 1997). However, these
data have to be interpreted with caution, since the concept of socioeconomic groups encompasses
parental occupational status and educational attainment as characteristics and thus diﬀers from a
pure income concept.
8are formally proven in Appendix A, so that only the basic argument is provided
here. First, subsidy s increases in tax t,i . e .ds/dt > 0. A higher tax yields larger
revenues. Ceteris paribus, it curbs the households’ net incomes and thus the demand
for university education. Both larger revenues and lower demand work in favour of
a higher subsidy per student.
Second, the marginal eﬀect of a rise in the tax level on the subsidy is the smaller,
the higher the tax, i.e. d2s/dt2 < 0.9 If the tax and, thus, the subsidy and the
number of students are rather low, additional revenues stemming from a higher
tax are only divided among a small group. The resulting subsidy increase is quite
substantial. But the larger the transfer level, the more people attend universities and
the larger is the group of recipients demanding their share of additional revenues.
T h em a r g i n a lr i s ei nt h es u b s i d yt h e nb e c o m e ss m a l l e ri ft h et a xg o e su p .
Finally, note that the participation rates are only given by (5) if b zj ∈ [z,z] holds.
To avoid tedious discussions of rather unrealistic corner solutions, the focus is on the
cases in which the threshold value b zj (s,t) is indeed between z and z.T h i so u t c o m e
can be guaranteed by restricting the parameter space:
Assumption 1:
(a) z <m w L and (b) z>m(wH − t)+s for {(s,t)|t − sE (s,t)=0 }.
These conditions are easy to interpret. On the one hand, the brightest children of
each income group attend university even if there is no government intervention (cf.
inequality (4)). On the other hand, no ﬁnancially feasible bundle (s,t) makes a
higher education degree achievable for the least able child in his social class. (Since




limits the feasible subsidy s, there exists a non-empty set
of parameters that fulﬁl this assumption. As will become evident below, a policy
such that all people of a generation go to universities would anyhow never achieve
a majority even if it were possible. But γH =1could, in principle, result if the
cost level z was too small. Considering such corner solutions, however, would not
generate fruitful insights.)
9The strictly concave relationship between s and t is guaranteed because (1) innate abilities
are uniformly distributed and (2) the willingness to pay for higher education, i.e. m(wj − t),
is proportional to net income. These two characteristics together are suﬃcient to avoid severe
‘technical’ complications, particularly with respect to the dynamic analysis. They are, however,
not necessary to obtain the following results. These assumptions imply, for instance, that the
number of students (6) is linear in the variables s, t,a n dH.T h u s ,s e c o n d a r y e ﬀects associated
with second derivatives and cross derivatives are neglected. To put it diﬀerently, the basic premise
is that the ‘ﬁrst-order’ eﬀects drive the overall outcome.
93.2 To be or not to be in Favour of a Subsidy
Having discussed the relationship between the tax t and the subsidy s,w ec a nn o w
turn to the individuals’ political preferences. This analysis is rather straightforward
in the current framework, since households can be clearly divided into two opposing
groups: On the one side, there are all those voters who reject any tax and education
subsidy. On the other side, there are the supporters of government intervention.
Within the latter group, no conﬂicts of interests arise, since all parents in favour
of public education spending agree on their preferred tax level. Hence, a clear-cut
dichotomy between the citizens for and those against public education spending
emerges. Let us explore the reasons for this outcome before it is precisely stated in
proposition 1 at the end of this section.
Consider ﬁrst a family whose child receives higher education. Given that the
child attends a university, the best policy for the family is the tax t that maximises
its utility U (wj − t + s(t) − zji,θ) and thus the diﬀerential s(t)−t,r e f e r r e dt oa snet
subsidy. Since the government budget constraint yields a strictly concave functional
relationship between the variables s and t,i . e . d2s/dt2 < 0 (see discussion above
and Appendix A), there exists a unique solution to to this maximisation problem,
implying a unique subsidy so.
Formally, this best policy follows from
max
s,t s(t) − t,( 7 )




This condition simply says that, in the optimum, a marginal tax increase equals
the induced rise of the subsidy (given a balanced government budget).10 Since taxes
are lump sum, (8) is identical for the two income groups. Thus, the solution to does
not depend on whether a higher income or a lower income household is considered.
It is also not aﬀected by the zji-type. To sum up, given that a child attends a
university the tax to and the corresponding subsidy so are the best that can happen
from the perspective of her parent.
By contrast, if a household’s child does not receive higher education, the parent
obviously opposes any tax, since the resulting transfers only beneﬁt other families.
In this case, the best policy is t =0(= s). The remaining question is whether
a parent prefers the tax to and sending her child to a university to the policy
t =0 . Evidently, the former alternative is the family’s best choice if, and only
10As ds/dt|t=0 > 1 holds, both optimal tax and subsidy have to be strictly positive.
10if, U (wj − to + so (to) − zji,θ) ≥ U (wj,θ) is fulﬁlled. Since the willingness to give
up consumption is proportional to the potential consumption level wj (cf. lemma 1
in Appendix A and the discussion above), a parent votes for the tax to if, and only
if,
zji ≤ mwj − t
o + s
o (t




holds. This condition means that a parent favours the tax to if the resulting net
subsidy so − to and her gross willingness to pay for education mwj together are
suﬃcient to cover the costs zji. If this is not the case, the citizen prefers to pay no
taxes at all and to relinquish higher education for her child.
Condition (9) has two important implications. First, since the gross willingness
to pay increases in the wage, a smaller fraction of the lower income class than of the





e zL − z
z − z
<





o),( 1 0 )
where ηL and ηH denote the respective fractions and e zj is deﬁned by (9). The
stronger political support of skilled parents simply stems from the stronger repre-
sentation of their children at universities.
Second, in each income group the parents whose children receive higher education
outnumber the parents who support the proposal to,i . e . γj >η j for t = to and
s = so. This implication can be easily explained. If the proposal to is already
implemented, the tax payment has to be made anyway and is sunk. In this case,
some families are willing to bear the remaining private education costs zji − so and
send their children to universities, although they prefer no tax at all at the political
stage and just a basic education for their children.
More importantly, the optimal values to and so strictly decrease in the number
of educated parents H. This result stems from a negative spending eﬀect.Al a r g e r
class size H increases the demand for higher education. To balance the government
budget, the subsidy has to fall for a given tax t. Moreover, the additional revenues
caused by a marginal tax increase are now distributed among a larger group of
recipients. Thus, the rise of the subsidy in response to a marginally higher tax turns
out to be smaller, the larger the class size H.S i n c e t h e b e n e ﬁts of a tax increase
decline, the optimal level to and the corresponding subsidy so decrease.
The main conclusions are summarized in
Proposition 1 Political Preferences.
i) A parent prefers the tax to that denotes the solution to maximisation problem (7)
to all other alternatives if, and only if, zji ≤ e zj (so(to),t o) holds. Conversely, a
11household favours the policy t =0over all other candidates if, and only if, zji >
e zj (so (to),t o) results.
ii) The optimal tax to and the corresponding subsidy so strictly decrease in the size
of the higher income group H.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Finally, note that the policy to maximises the net subsidy by excluding a fraction
of the young generation from higher education. Hence, enrolments deﬁnitely fall
below unity for the policy outcome (so,t o).
4 Education Policy and Social Stratiﬁcation
Having explored the political preferences and the relationship between taxes and
subsidies, let us now turn to the ﬁnal step and analyse the equilibrium and the dy-
namic properties of the socioeconomic system. Today’s political choice determines
current enrolments, which in turn ﬁx class size and thus the society’s starting po-
sition in the future. Two succeeding periods are linked via the ‘inherited’ number
of skilled and unskilled workers. Through this connection and the impact of social
stratiﬁcation on political majorities, public education spending is the result of both
current votes and past democratic choices.
4 . 1 E l e c t i o nR e s u l t sa n dt h eS i z eo fI n c o m eG r o u p s
Since higher income and lower income supporters of a government intervention agree
on their favoured policy, there is a clear-cut dichotomy of interests. The most
preferred tax of a household is either to or 0, as stated in proposition 1. In any case,
one of these two proposals is favoured over all other alternatives. The electorate can
thus be divided into two opposing parties, and the favourite proposal of the larger
party is the Condorcet winner, the alternative that wins against any other policy at
the polls in a pairwise comparison.11
Given that each stance is supported by households in both income groups, the
political dispute is certainly not a ‘traditional class conﬂict’. The main issue of the
current paper is not redistribution between income groups, but redistribution be-
tween those who send their children to universities and those who do not. Despite
this fact, the question of which of the two proposals gains the upper hand crucially
depends on the society’s social composition. As inequality (10) shows, public edu-
cation spending is more popular among skilled parents than among unskilled. Since
11The clear-cut dichotomy guarantees an election winner despite the fact that not all voters have
single-peaked political preferences.
12the children of skilled parents predominantly go to university, a larger fraction of
higher income families beneﬁts from a subsidy. This suggests that the votes in favour
of the alternative to increase in class size H. And indeed, this notion is conﬁrmed
in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 ‘Static’ Equilibrium.
The proposal to wins the election if the size of the higher income class H exceeds a
threshold value H. Otherwise, the proposal t =0gains a majority against any other
alternative.
I provide a formal proof in Appendix B and now explore the economic intuition
in more detail. First, note that the number of citizens who vote for the policy to,




o)=ηLL + ηHH = ηL +[ ηH − ηL]H,( 1 1 )
where (10) is used. Since ηH is greater than ηL, V increases in H, ceteris paribus.
Beside this electorate composition eﬀect, however, there is another impact. Changes
in class size also aﬀect the optimal tax to,a sa r g u e di np r o p o s i t i o n1 . B u tt h i s
impact is only a ‘second-order’ eﬀect that determines the level of the tax to and of the
corresponding subsidy so but not whether the proposal to achieves a majority. While
the preferred tax of those in favour of government intervention and the corresponding
subsidy indeed decrease in the number of higher income households, more skilled
parents ﬁrst of all strengthen the support for some public education spending. If H
exceeds a critical value H, the proposal to wins at the polls, i.e. V ≥ 0.5 if H ≥ H.
In this case, the majority of skilled parents supported by lower income families with
talented (i.e. low costs) children decides the election in favour of the policy to.
Otherwise, i.e. if H<H and thus V< 0.5, a majority prefers the alternative t =0
and rejects any government intervention, as stated in proposition 2.
Given this ‘static’ election result, the precise evolution of education policy and
its impact on class size can ﬁnally be analysed. Thereby,ap a r t i c u l a rf o c u si so n
the question of whether a subsidy, once introduced, is politically sustainable.
4.2 ‘Educational’ Take-oﬀ and Decline
The dynamics of the system are already partly indicated in propositions 1 and 2. As
shown above, active government involvement can only gain a majority at the polls if
t h es i z eo ft h eh i g h e ri n c o m ec l a s si ss u ﬃciently large. The threshold value H might
be smaller than zero or greater than one, meaning that a majority for education
13subsidies either always exists or can never be achieved.12 More interesting, however,
is the case in which H lies in the open interval (0,1) and will be reached over time.
The resultant dynamics of the system are illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The evolution of
public education spending and social stratiﬁcation is ﬁrst explained step by step and








Figure 1: Evolution of Education Policy and Social Stratiﬁcation
Assume that the higher income class’s size in the starting period H0 is very small
and falls below H (subscripts of variables changing over time refer to the respective
period). There is, thus, no majority for an active education policy at the beginning
of the time horizon. But if the number of university students from lower income
families outweighs the number of higher income class children who do not attend
universities, the group of skilled people will grow over time. This dynamic process
is described by the diﬀerence equation (6) for s = t =0 ,w h i c hr e l a t e st h ec l a s ss i z e
o ft h es k i l l e di nt h en e x tp e r i o dEκ+1, Eκ+1 = Hκ, to its present size Hκ.
This development heads towards a stable steady state with no education subsidies
unless the ﬁgure H tops the threshold value H in any period. If wages and willingness
to pay for education are rather high, or costs are suﬃciently low, the class size H
will once be above H. Suppose this is the case in period κ,a ss h o w ni nﬁgure 1.
12As i m p l es u ﬃcient condition for H<1 to hold is mwH > (1/2)(z + z).I n t h i s c a s e , m o r e
than 50% of the higher income households send their children to universities even if the government
does not intervene, and thus necessarily support the policy to.
14An ‘educational’ take-oﬀ then occurs, meaning that a majority of higher income
and lower income households with talented children push through a tax ﬁnanced
education subsidy. The distributional eﬀects of this policy are ambiguous. On the
one hand, this policy is at the expense of the many unskilled parents who pay
taxes but whose children only receive basic schooling. On the other hand, the
public education spending indeed opens up access to universities for children from
lower income families and improves the equality of opportunity. The ratio of the
participation rates γL/γH increases, indicating the enhanced social mobility and
educational integration. The subsidy, moreover, boosts the number of students in
general.
But this phase does not last forever. After a period of extension, the ‘success’ of
the education spending causes its decline. The government intervention has fostered
the change of the society’s social composition. But a larger group of skilled parents
increases the demand for education and thus makes publicly ﬁnanced, or at least
supported, universities more costly. Maintaining the same subsidy per student would
require a signiﬁcant tax increase. Even more, the positive impact of a marginal tax
change on the subsidy is smaller, since the number of recipients has grown. In
response to this negative spending eﬀect, the supporters of government intervention
now prefer lower taxes. This tax cut, combined with the demand increase, necessarily
implies that the subsidies decline more than proportionally, leading to falling net
subsidies s−t. All in all, there is still a majority for an active government role, but
this majority calls for larger private contributions and pushes through a policy that
leads to a drop in subsidies.
Despite the partial withdrawal of the government, the overall number of students
further increases. This rise is due to the change in the society’s social composition
and its direct eﬀect, namely the demand shift caused by a larger class size H.T h e
induced political shift curbs the rise in enrolments because a lower net subsidy cuts
the participation rate of both the lower income and the higher income classes, γL
and γH. But this indirect impact is only a secondary eﬀect in response to the initial
demand boost. Thus, the change in class size is the dominant force and drives the
number of students up.
The shift in the political preferences, however, shapes the social openness of
the university system and thus social stratiﬁcation. Since lower income families are
particularly aﬀected by the spending cuts, the fraction of their children attending
university γL drops more than proportionally. The declining ratio γL/γH indicates
the deteriorating opportunities of this group. The described withdrawal of the gov-
ernment in the aftermath of the ‘educational’ take-oﬀ and the implied ‘disintegra-
tion’ of the society continue in the ensuing periods. Rising enrolments today further
15increase future education demand via the class-size eﬀect. Since the subsidy system
is put under even more strain, further cuts in education spending occur. While the
fraction of unskilled parents drops, the remaining children from lower income fami-
lies fall more and more into an education trap. The whole process ﬁnally converges
towards a steady state with smaller but still positive taxes and subsidies. These
dynamics of the socioeconomic system are summarised in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Evolution of Education Policy and Social Stratiﬁcation.
Assume that the system described above starts with no higher income households,
i.e. H =0 . Then, it shows the following dynamic properties:
i) The size of the skilled class and the number of students increase over time and
converge towards a strictly positive value in the stable steady state. On this path, the
policy t =0wins the elections as long as the number of skilled parents is below the
threshold value H. If the number of higher income households exceeds the critical
level H in period κ,t h et a xto will gain a majority at the polls in this and all
succeeding periods, leading to the corresponding subsidy so.
ii) After introducing a strictly positive tax and subsidy in period κ, the variables s, t
and the ‘net’ subsidy s −t decrease over time and converge towards strictly positive
steady state levels.
iii) The ratio of the participation rates γL/γH increases in period κ. It strictly
decreases afterwards until it reaches its steady state value.
Proof. See Appendix B.
5 Discussion
Like all models, the present framework provides a simpliﬁed picture of the actual
world. In this section, some major assumptions, their implications and some possible
generalisations are brieﬂy discussed.
First, in the current model there are no subsidies before the ‘educational’ take-oﬀ
occurs (see ﬁgure 1). This feature certainly exaggerates the rise in public spending.
Even before an expansion of the type described above takes place, some kind of
government intervention is usually supported by the electorate. Many citizens who
do deﬁnitely not directly gain from an education subsidy nevertheless vote for some
public spending. These individuals might indirectly beneﬁt from increased aggregate
human capital because it positively aﬀects the earnings of the uneducated (Creedy
and Francois, 1990), the return on capital (Soares, 2003), and the tax base and
thus the ﬁnancial means for redistributive measures (Beviá and Iturbe-Ormaetxe,
2002). So the education subsidy should be positive in the pre-expansion periods.
16But this does not contradict the current arguments for an ‘educational’ take-oﬀ and
an ensuing decline in public spending.
Second, by considering only two person families, the model suggests that a ma-
jority for public spending requires an overall participation rate that exceeds 0.5.
This feature, which frequently appears in the literature on the political economics of
higher education (for instance, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995), of course overstates
the number of immediate beneﬁciaries necessary for an expansion of the public ed-
ucation system to occur. It could be avoided in several ways without aﬀecting the
basic mechanisms analysed in this paper. For instance, once families with two par-
ents and more than one child are considered, already one talented child provides
suﬃcient incentives for the parents to support government intervention. Thus, a
majority of citizens can favour an education subsidy, although only a minority of
the children attends universities. Moreover, parents are well-informed about the
abilities of their children, but not with absolute certainty. In the case of risk averse
parents, they might vote in favour of public education spending even if the prob-
ability that their children are talented and will indeed attend a university is not
particularly high. Thereby, they insure themselves against the ‘costly’ outcome that
receiving higher education is indeed worthwhile for their children. Again, the num-
ber of parents supporting subsidies can substantially exceed the number of students.
Third, only an income-independent education subsidy is considered, although
in reality we also observe regressive and progressive ﬁnancial assistance. However,
income-independent subsidies, mainly in the form of low, or no, tuition fees, still
constitute a major component of total spending on higher education in many coun-
tries. From a political-economic perspective, progressive subsidies like means-tested
grants can be seen as an instrument to broaden the support for public education
spending among lower income households. They thus reduce the threshold level H,
but do not necessarily contradict the present conclusions.
Fourth, in the present model cuts in education spending are only reﬂected in a
lower subsidy. Considering the expenditure patterns and the political discussions
in countries like Britain and Germany, the picture that emerges is more compli-
cated. Declining public funding per student is, at least initially, not compensated
by higher private contributions, but it leads to lower education quality, reﬂected in
rising student-staﬀ ratios, old equipment, and so on.13 Only after this process of
deterioration has continued for some time, will an intense discussion about higher
private contributions begin, and moderate changes are (about being) implemented.
Drastic reforms still need much more time. Therefore, the current analysis outlines
13See, for instance, Greenaway and Haynes (2003) for a brief sketch of the development of the
British university system.
17a possible basic development rather than the precise steps.
Fifth, the present approach ignores any eﬀects on social mobility caused by
economic growth (for instance, Galor and Tsiddon, 1997, and Owen and Weil, 1998).
If technological inventions and aggregate human capital positively aﬀect general
productivity and thus increase gross wages of the skilled and unskilled, they boost
education demand of both income groups. This not only makes it more likely that
the ‘educational’ take-oﬀ occurs, since wage growth decreases the threshold value
H. It also at least mitigates the ensuing decline in participation rates. However,
if the productivity gains are skilled-biased, they mainly increase the demand for
education of higher income households. This might even lower the ratio between
the participation rates of the lower income and the higher income families γL/γH.
Sixth, considering lump-sum taxation, the current analysis focuses on the con-
ﬂict between those families whose children attend universities and those who do
not. If a diﬀerent tax schedule is implemented, further conﬂicts of interests arise.
In the case of a proportional or progressive tax on labour income, for example,
lower income families whose children attend universities beneﬁt twice from public
education spending. They receive a subsidy ﬁnanced by all households, and they
contribute less in absolute terms to the tax revenues than their wealthier counter-
parts. Because of the additional redistributive impact, overall support for a subsidy
among the lower income households is strengthened while that among higher in-
come households is diluted. Since the latter group gains political power over time,
a less regressive taxation might rather reinforce the decline in education spending.
Moreover, in the case of more than two income groups, an ‘ends against the middle’
phenomenon similar to that in Epple and Romano (1996) might appear.
Finally, the present model implies a simple relationship between family income
and private education spending. In reality, the link between social background and
educational choice is certainly more complex. For instance, Sjögren (2000) argues
that an individual’s uncertainty about her ability to be successful in an occupation
is greater in the case of occupations distant from the parents’ occupation than in
the case of familiar ones. Thus, risk-averse individuals tend to choose careers that
are similar to those of their parents. So even in countries with modest income
disparity, the family background should aﬀect the educational and occupational
choices.14 This inﬂuence of family characteristics, however, does not mean that
economic incentives are unimportant. By contrast, Sjögren (2000) shows that under
certain conditions individuals from lower income families are particularly sensitive
14This notion is supported by numerous papers which stress the role of family characteristics like
the human capital of parents for the children’s educational attainment. See, for instance, Haveman
and Wolfe (1995).
18to economic incentives.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The present paper highlights some of the underlying mechanisms that can induce an
‘educational’ take-oﬀ and an ensuing decline in public spending. It analyses how the
political outcome interacts with the evolution of class size and the changing political
preferences of the groups supporting a tax ﬁnanced subsidy. As we have seen, the
current call for higher private contributions might rather reﬂect a broad trend in
public opinion than a short-lived political mood.
The line of reasoning in this paper has a simple point of departure: the demand
for higher education increases in the number of educated parents because their chil-
dren attend universities more than proportionally, and the families of students are
those who support the respective tax ﬁnanced subsidy as a means of redistributing
resources to them. Given this starting point, the expansion of public spending and
the ensuing cuts are driven by two opposing forces that are generated by the same
source, the increasing number of skilled parents. The rise of the educated class
leads to a majority for an ‘educational’ take-oﬀ. This expansion of public education
spending further boosts the number of skilled individuals and thus future demand
for higher education. This shift in demand implies that the initial subsidy becomes
too expensive to be politically sustainable. Although the majority for some pub-
lic spending is broadened, the preferred levels decline over time. Nevertheless, the
number of students rises further, both reﬂecting the changing social composition and
reinforcing these changes. But despite growing enrolments, the ratio between the
participation rates of the lower income and the higher income families falls. Equality
of opportunity deteriorates.
As argued in the previous section, the path shown describes a broad tendency
rather than a precise development. The basic argument is that universities will
become fenced in so that the increase in demand is at least partly depressed. An
obvious strategy to achieve this goal is to require higher private contributions. There
are, however, other measures that can serve this end. For instance, institutional
arrangements at the school level can work in favour of social selection, thus reducing
the group of potential recipients of an education subsidy. In addition to analysing
the evolution of public spending on higher education, it is thus worthwhile exploring
the evolution of the education system as a whole. This demands a closer look at the
institutional design and particularly at the interplay between the school system and
the system of higher education. These issues are left for further research.
19Appendix A
Lemma 1: Willingness to Pay for Higher Education.
A parent’s maximum willingness to pay for higher education equals the fraction m
of the potential family consumption level x0, i.e. the maximum willingness to pay
for higher education will amount to mx0 if the family consumes x0 i nt h ec a s ei n
which the child only receives basic education. The fraction m is independent of the
potential consumption level and lies in the open interval (0,1).
Proof. Deﬁne m := (x0 − x00)/x0. Properties (i) and (ii) guarantee the existence of
a bundle (x0,x 00) such that U(x0,θ)=U(x00,θ) holds. Hence, for a potential family
consumption level x0 the maximum willingness to pay for higher education equals
x0−x00 = mx0. Then, property (iii) implies that a parent facing the potential family
consumption level λx0 is ready to give up λx0 − λx00 = m(λx0).T h u s , f r a c t i o n m
does not depend on the potential consumption level. Property (i) guarantees m>0,
and property (ii) implies m<1.
Relationship between Subsidy and Tax for a Balanced Budget
To make the following derivatives more accessible, the government budget is refor-
mulated, using (4), (5) and (6):
B (s,t;H)=t − sE (s,t;H)=t − s
m[wL +( wH − wL)H − t]+s − z
z − z
,( A 1 )
where E (s,t;H) captures the optimal education choices of the utility-maximising
households. The budget constraint B (s,t;H)=0implicitly yields s as a function



























¢2 ,( A 3 )
where the derivatives follow from (A1). The denominator of (A3) is positive. Denote
the numerator by Ω. Reformulating this term shows that Ω > 0 ⇔ 2(∂B/∂s)
(∂2B/∂t∂s) − (∂B/∂t)(∂2B/∂s2) > 0 ⇔ (∂E/∂s)+( ∂E/∂t)E>0,w h e r et h el a s t












.( A 4 )
20(Note that m ∈ (0,1) according to lemma 1.) Thus, d2s/dt2 < 0 results.
Finally, note that the properties of the budget constraint shown above and
the property ds/dt|t=0 =1 /E (0,0;H) > 1 imply a unique solution to (7), where
so (to) >t o > 0 holds.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
i) The proof follows the lines of reasoning presented in section 3. As argued there, a
child either attends university or receives basic schooling. In the former case, the in-
equality U (so (to),t o;θ)=U (wj − to + so(to) − zji,θ) >U(wj − t + s(t) − zji,θ)
= U (s(t),t;θ) for all t 6= to follows from maximisation (7). In the latter case,
U (0,0;θ)=U (wj,θ) >U (wj − t,θ)=Uij (s(t),t;θ) for all t>0. Conse-
quently, if inequality (9) is fulﬁlled (not fulﬁlled), Uij (so (to),t o;θ) ≥ Uij (0,0,θ)
(Uij (so(to),t o;θ) <U ij (0,0;θ)) and therefore Uij (so (to),t o;θ) ≥ Uij (s(t),t;θ)
(Uij (s(t),t;θ) <U ij (0,0;θ))f o ra l lt. The parent prefers the tax to (the tax t =0 ).
ii) Usual comparative statics proves the second part of proposition 1. A glance at
the government budget constraint, (A1) and (A2) reveals that both H and t aﬀect the
ﬁrst-order condition (8) directly and indirectly via s. Utilising these relationships,






















(cf. (A3)). The government budget constraint B (s,t;H)=0implies ∂s(t;H)/∂H
= −[∂B(s,t;H)/∂H]/[∂B(s,t;H)/∂s]. This equation, (A2), (A3), (A5) and the






































¢ ,( A 6 )
where the derivatives again follow from (A1). The denominator of (A6) is positive,
since it is, of course, equal to the numerator of (A3) for ds/dt = −[∂B(s,t)/∂t]/
[∂B(s,t)/∂s]=1 . Concerning the numerator, ∂E/∂H > 0 follows from (A1).
M o r e o v e r ,s o m es i m p l er e f o r m u l a t i o n ss h o wt h a tE − s(∂E/∂s+ ∂E/∂t)=
{m[wL +( wH − wL)H − to + so] − z}/(z − z) ∈ (0,1) because of the chain of in-
equalities z>m (wH − to)+so >m [wL +( wH − wL)H − to + so] >m w L >z ,
which follows from assumption 1 and so (to) − to > 0 (see last remark in Appendix
A). Thus, the numerator is negative, and dt/dH < 0 results.
21Finally, ds(t;H)/dH = ∂s(t;H)/∂H +(ds(t;H)/dt)(dt/dH), ds/dt =1 ,( A 2 )




























¢ < 0,( A 7 )
s i n c et h en u m e r a t o ri sa g a i nn e g a t i v e .
Proof of Proposition 2





{z − m[wL +( wH − wL)H − t]},( A 8 )
w h i c hi sr e f e r r e dt oa ssfoc-function (foc stands for ﬁrst-order condition). Next,





− m[wL +( wH − wL)H]+t.( A 9 )
(A9) is labelled sv-function (v stands for 50 percent of the vote). It implies that
V (so (to),t o) T 0.5 ⇔ sfoc T sv for t = to in (A8) and (A9).

















z,( A 1 0 )
where ∂e t/∂H > 0 results. Since ∂sv/∂t =1>m / (2 − m)=dsfoc/dt > 0 holds,
sfoc T sv ⇔ t S e t. (Recall that m ∈ (0,1) according to lemma 1.) Therefore,
V (so (to),t o) T 0.5 ⇔ to S e t.
Deﬁne H as the threshold value such that V (so(H),t o(H)) = 0.5.C o n s i d e rt h e








. As the optimal values so and to decrease
in H (see proposition 1, part ii), to (H) S to(H)) ⇔ H T H. By contrast, (A10)
implies that e t(H) T e t(H) ⇔ H T H.T h u s , to(H) S e t(H) ⇔ H T H results,
which leads to V (so(to),t o) T 0.5 ⇔ H T H. Given the clear-cut dichotomy (see
proposition 1, part i), this relationship completes the proof because V (so (to),t o)
gives the fraction of citizens who choose the tax to i nt h ed e c i s i v ev o t ea g a i n s tt h e
proposal t =0 .
Proof of Proposition 3
i) First, the proof shows that if (s,t)=( 0 ,0) is implemented in each period, H
strictly increases over time and converges towards a stable steady state b H (0,0).
22Second, I argue that if (so,t o) i si m p l e m e n t e di ne a c hp e r i o d ,H strictly increases
and converges towards a stable steady state b H (so,t o).T h i r d ,b H (so,t o) > b H (0,0) is
shown to hold. These three parts together imply proposition 3 i), as argued below.
Step 1: Assume that (s,t)=( 0 ,0) is implemented in each period. In this
case, the diﬀerence equation (6), which describes the evolution of the number of the
skilled, reduces to Hκ = E(Hκ−1)=γL(0,0) + [γH (0,0) − γL(0,0)]Hκ−1.T h i si n
turn leads to Hκ =[ H0 − γL/(1 − γH + γL)](γH − γL)
κ+γL/(1 − γH + γL).S i n c e
[γH (0,0) − γL(0,0)] ∈ (0,1) by assumption 1, H strictly increases over time and
converges to the stable steady state b H (0,0) = γL (0,0)/[1 − γH (0,0) + γL(0,0)].
b H is strictly positive but smaller than unity because γH < 1 (again by assumption
1). Consequently, if the systems starts with H =0and b H (0,0) < H holds, H never
exceeds H, the policy t =0wins every election (see proposition 2), and H increases
over time and converges towards the stable steady state b H (0,0).
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w h e r et h ed e r i v a t i v e sa g a i nf o l l o wf r o m( A 1 ) .T h en u m e r a t o ro ft h eq u o t i e n ti sp o s i -
tive, since ∂E/∂s > −∂E/∂t > 0 (see (A4)) and E−s[(∂E/∂s)+( ∂E/∂t)] ∈ (0,1)
(see discussion after (A6)). The denominator is positive too (cf. (A6)). Furthermore,

































,( A 1 3 )
where ds/dt =1⇔− ∂B/∂s = ∂B/∂t ⇔ E + s∂E/∂s =1− s∂E/∂t and (A4)
are utilised. Thus, the whole term in the brackets is positive and smaller than
one. In addition, ∂E/∂H = γH − γL ∈ (0,1) holds. Therefore, dHκ/dHκ−1 ∈
(0,1) results. That means that H converges to a stable steady state b H (so,t o)=
γL (so,t o)/[1 − γH (so,t o)+γL (so,t o)].( N o t e t h a t (so,t o) remains constant over
time if, and only if, H does not change.) Moreover, b H (so,t o) ∈ (0,1) follows from
γH < 1 (see assumption 1).
Step 3: The relationships 1−γH (0,0)+γL(0,0) = 1−[m(wH − wL)]/(z − z)=
1 − γH (so,t o)+γL(so,t o) (cf. (4) and (5)) and γL (0,0) = (mwL − z)/(z − z) <
[m(wL − to)+so − z]/(z − z)=γL(so,t o),w h i c hf o l l o w sf r o mso >t o (see last
remark in Appendix A), lead to b H (0,0) < b H (so,t o). If the system starts with
23H =0and b H (0,0) > H holds, H exceeds H in some period κ.F r o m s t e p 1 , w e
know that H increases until period κ. Then, the policy to wins the election and the
dynamics is described by (A12). Since H<b H (0,0) still holds in period κ, H is still
below b H (so,t o). Therefore, H further increases in the succeeding periods (see step
2) and the proposal to wins each election from period κ on (see proposition 2) until
b H (so,t o) is reached in the stable steady state.
ii) As shown above, H increases further in the periods following κ and converges
towards its steady state level. Thus, ds/dH < 0 and dt/dH < 0 (see proposition
1, part ii) imply that the variables soand to decrease over time, converging to their
levels in the stable steady state. Showing the relation ∂(so−to)/∂H < 0 is suﬃcient
to prove that (s − t) also declines from period κ on (towards the steady state level).
Using (A6) and (A7) yields
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The denominator is positive (cf. (A6)). By contrast, the numerator is negative
because ∂E/∂H > 0 follows from (A1) and E − s[(∂E/∂s)+( ∂E/∂t)] ∈ (0,1)
holds (see discussion after (A6)). All in all, ∂ (s − t)/∂H < 0 results. Finally, the
last remark in Appendix A implies that so,t o and so − to are strictly positive.
iii) First, γL/γH =[ m(wL − t)+s − z]/[m(wH − t)+s − z] is positively cor-
related with the term [s − mt], i.e.
∂ (γL/γH)
∂ [s − mt]
=
m(wH − wL)
[m(wH − t)+s − z]
2 > 0.( A 1 5 )
Second, the inequalities ∂s/∂H < 0, ∂t/∂H < 0 and ∂ (s − t)/∂H < 0 (see
(A6), (A7) and (A14)) imply (∂s/∂H) − m(∂t/∂H) < (∂s/∂H) − (∂t/∂H) < 0,
w h i c hi nt u r nl e a d st o∂ [s − mt]/∂H < ∂ (s − t)/∂H < 0. Consequently, the term
[s − mt] moves in the same direction as (s − t) does over time. This relationship in
connection with (A15) and ii) completes the proof.
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